This is an excerpt from a book I'm working on....
There may be infinite readings of this or
that text but there are still good and bad readings. A good reading is creative.
Things once familiar become refreshingly unfamiliar. The reader is a progenitor
of the uncanny as habit falls away and a thing experienced hundreds of times
suddenly comes into focus as if for the very first time. Few things exhilarate
the way a good reading does. A fine and fresh distinction or well-placed
reversal infuses the banal with vitality, the quotidian with wonder, the dead
with life.
My first exposure to a reading which left
my heart palpitating and the ground beneath my feet forever and gloriously
unsure came at the hands of one of the reader’s most ready tropes: the
reversal. In the reversal, expectation and assumptions are, well, reversed.
Nietzsche loves reversals. Christian morality, he argues, is built on hate and
resentment cloaked in the passive aggressive stance of love. Christian belief
in god is nihilistic, a belief in nothing rather than a living through of life
— a devastating reversal as Christian love becomes hate and faith becomes
nihilism.
I was in Mr. Tucker’s 11th grade AP American
History class. A fan of the revisionist Marxist historians (it was an odd
school), Mr. Tucker had us read Gabriel Kolko’s essay on the creation of the
USDA that claimed that the USDA and its dispensation of approval — those
assuring gradations of meat — were not born
of consumer advocacy but were in fact a foil of the meat industry, an industry
suffering due to Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle which exposed the
grotesqueries of meat packing. The USDA, then, was not only not there to protect my fellow citizens
and me — it was in fact an elaborate
abuse of governmental ethos, a ploy to move product, a product which may very
well be harmful to the very citizens the USDA was nominally formed to protect.
It was exhilarating!
My second great reading encounter came in
college, in a Women’s Studies lecture with Carroll Smith-Rosenberg. Her lecture
concerned the culture of the faint Victorian woman. Expecting to hear the tale
of patriarchic oppression (which at the time seemed interesting and familiar to
my decidedly uninteresting and familiar mind), my body readied itself for
confirmation. But the tale I was to hear snapped me right to attention. The
feminine assumption of weakness, it turns out, was not solely a means by which
men subjugated women. No, the faintness of Victorian women was in fact a
strategy by which a woman could a) avoid the toiling duties of housekeeper and
hostess; and b) if institutionalized, be with other women. A feminine posture
of weakness and the entire medical culture surrounding it was not just another example of men keeping
women down; it was in fact a feminine
strategy of survival and pleasure. (Reversals demand italics — they make
the words themselves careen.)
In The History of Sex v.1, Michel
Foucault argues that the discourse of the repression and liberation of
sexuality is part of the same discourse of power: repression does not repress
and liberation does not liberate. They are both constitutive of a will to power
that endlessly articulates sex and rigorously controls it. For Foucault, the
very notion that sex is something that can be repressed and hence liberated is
part of the system of control that is built on the logic of the depth: the soul
must be mined to its deep, dark recesses.
How does Foucault reach this conclusion? He
spent days, weeks, months in the archives and found a veritable explosion of
documents speaking, in one way or another, about sex. Sex clearly was not
repressed. And yet we walk around speaking as though it were, as though it were
in need of liberation. Foucault, then, looks at what we say and what we do and the relationship between the two
These, I am arguing, are good
readings. Rather than taking the world at its word, these readings heed the
performance of the text at hand and then put it all together in a surprising
way, flipping the thing’s own claims on its head which, in turn, creates new
architectures of becoming. A good reading does not confirm the known; it spins
the elements into new shapes, new possibilities so we see the thing anew, as if
for the very first time.
Reversal is only one tactic of
reading. One does not need to reverse in order to render the world uncanny. Take
Kierkegaard’s reading of Plato. When I borrow from Kierkegaard and say that
Socrates proffers a way of life (irony), not a rigid philosophy (Platonism with
its Forms), I am not reversing Plato. Rather, I am offering an alternate way to
read Plato’s texts, how they behave.
In
any case, the goal of the reader is to fold, pleat, spin, cut, shape the world
in some way that does not seek to confirm the
known but rather seeks the unknown.
To read well is literally an adventure, a
forward looking propriety, a thing being made in the very act of reading. As
Steve Zissou declares at the end of Wes Anderson's film, The Life Aquatic,
"This is an adventure."
This is really a matter of one’s posture
in the world, how one stands towards things, towards experience. Do you seek to recognize world? Or (re)create it? Of course, we often seek
to confirm what we know. This is not a bad thing. On the contrary, it is
necessary. This is how we organize our world. But when I come to a book or art
or politics or sometimes just a glass of tequila, I want to see it anew; I want
to spin it into new shapes and new modes of living. I want to be lead astray of
myself, taken somewhere new and exciting. I want the world to shimmer and
gleam.
Of course, not all readings fare so well.
Søren Kierkegaard claims that so-called Christianity mis-reads Jesus and His
Testament. The Church, Kierkegaard tells us, picks up where the Gospels leave
off, after Jesus has risen. But for
Kierkegaard, Christianity — and faith in particular — is a matter of reckoning
the life of Jesus. A poor, skinny Jew
stands before you and claims to be the eternal God. Believe him or don’t: that
is the struggle of faith. A historically specific person claims to be eternal;
it’s absurd. And yet it is precisely on the strength of this absurdity that a
true Christian finds faith. To premise one’s faith on a Jesus who has risen is,
for Kierkegaard, to miss Christianity all together. After all, Jesus’ words
come while he is alive. So Kierkegaard asks us to be contemporaneous with the text, with the disciplines, to hear Jesus’
words as if they were spoken, while He was still alive and the burden of faith
is on you. It’s not that the Church is wrong per se; rather, it’s that the
Church reads the Gospels badly.
Ted Morgan entitles his biography of
William S. Burroughs, Literary Outlaw.
Few would find this title surprising; indeed, it seems appropriate. After all,
Burroughs is the bad-boy of literature, eschewing plot, consistency of voice,
character development, and perhaps every other literary convention. This
reading works.
But it’s not terribly interesting. Burroughs,
reading himself, takes issue with this characterization of his work: "To
be an outlaw you must first have a base in law to reject and get out of. I
never had such a base." That is to say, to read Burroughs as an outlaw is
to read him as reacting to the laws
of literature rather than (re)inventing
them.
A good reading is uncanny, taking the familiar and making it unfamiliar so you at
once know and don’t know the thing. To see things, to think things, to sense things that you didn’t even know
existed, to experience turns of thought, insights and twists, nuance and
qualifications: a good reading is exhilarating. To read a good reading of a
film or painting or book is akin to seeing Rafael Nadal work his opponent to
one side of the court before delivering a drop shot to the other side; it’s
akin to watching Michael Jordan penetrate a defense, stop, turn, jump in the
air backwards and sink a basket without a hint of rim. A good reading is
athletic.
A
reading can’t really be wrong — there is no code to be deciphered, no truth
awaiting behind or within the words. The author will not come to deliver the
Word from on high. Nor will the critic or the professor. All there are are different
readings.
And yet a reading
can be out of bounds. To say that Moby Dick is a tale of Soviet
oppression is just plain silly. And, I suppose, we can say it’s wrong. Such a
reading can be violent to a text, making it bend in uncomfortable ways. So perhaps
rather than saying a reading is wrong, we can say a reading is distasteful? Unethical?
Foul — as in baseball? Yes, I like “foul” because it is at once ethical,
aesthetic, and fair. There may be no proof
that a reading is right but there is evidence—
a foul pole of a sort. To read
something demands attention, an accounting for what’s there, for what’s happening. It is empirical.
And then there
are plain old bad readings of things.
These are readings that may very well be in bounds but that are bad for any
number of reasons. A bad reading may make the thing less interesting, quashing
its multivalences, such as the writing on the wall in the museum at the Philip
Guston show that reduced Guston’s work to a symptom of his childhood. Or
calling Burroughs an “outlaw” when he really is an outlaw of both the law and
the outlaws. And, to be fair to Ted Morgan, I think this is how we can read his
title: Burroughs is not an outlaw per se, he is always already outside the law.
A bad reading may just be obvious, the reader
not really doing anything at all but echoing that which has already declared
itself. An example might be when a reader reads Nietzsche and claims that
Nietzsche does not believe in truth. That’s a bad reading because, well,
Nietzsche’s texts say they do not believe in, or ascribe to, truth as a value
in and of itself. A good reading
would tease out the rhetorical nuance of Nietzsche's claim, perhaps show how
truth functions for him — as not just something that is or isn't but as
something that operates within an elaborate will to power and how that might
impact what it is to be a reader of Nietzsche. In any case, a good reading does
not reduce or state the obvious: it sheds light on places you didn't even know
existed — as perhaps they didn't before this reading.
2 comments:
There is also the issue of over-reading. Or over-interpretation. The sort that valorizes a text and ascribes more meaning than the text will bear. Much New Testament hermeneutics by evangelicals (& medievalists) falls into this category. Also, Midrash scholasticism.
Take a metaphor: Some guy named Jesus taking the fall for his gang of rowdies at a Passover festival a couple thousand years ago, getting executed for it, and the subsequent mythologization of a simple, unselfish act by a gang leader into a prescription for eternal salvation. Get my drift?
Marx, too, e.g., can be made to say whatever.
We then enter into the Foucauldian territory where systems of preconceptions determine readings, no?
Quite a pickle you've set for yourself in this book you're writing. Fine-tuning interpretations of laws and judicial constructions of same just is the fight of jurisprudence as well. Lots of ground to cover. I look forward to reading more of your project.
Academics and zealots do love to push a text beyond what that text wants to do. Sometimes, it can be beautiful or strange or hilarious — even if being a bad reading.
My book is, alas, about reading, not about notions of justice — although I believe there are implications for jurisprudence. But, as you suggest, that gets very, very complicated and would involve me doing research on different legal systems. When all I really want to talk about is this act of reading something — a book, film, person, tequila.
I do try to address the ideology/Foucauldian issue of discourse (pre)determining our readings. But we always are where we are; there is no being outside of our manifestation in this culture, this time, this place. We begin where we begin. And we make discourse as much as discourse makes us.....for the rest, you'll have to read the book!
Thanks, as always, Jim for reading and commenting.
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